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Abstract  
With the increased popularity of online video streaming comes the risk of this technology’s 
subsequent abuse. With a number of cases noted in 2017 where individuals have engaged 
with illegal or policy breaching video content, digital forensics practitioners are often tasked 
with investigating the subsequent ‘fingerprint’ of such acts. This is often to determine both the 
content of a stream in question, and, how it has been interacted with, typically from an analysis 
of data residing on a suspect’s local device. This article provides an examination of the 
forensic procedures required to identify and reconstruct cached video stream data using both 
YouTube and Facebook Live as example case studies. Stream reconstruction methodologies 
are offered where results show that where a YouTube and Facebook Live video have been 
played, buffered video stream data can be reassembled to produce a viewable video clip of 
content. 
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1 Introduction 
To highlight the issues surrounding on-line video streaming, initial reference is drawn to the 
following comments made by the National Crime Agency in December 2017. 
“The use of live streaming platforms by online sex offenders is increasing…During 
a recent week of intensification to tackle child sexual exploitation and abuse, police 
and NCA operations across the UK safeguarded 245 children and arrested 192 
people, 18 of whom were in a position of trust. 30% of those cases involved some 
of the highest harm offences including live streaming, blackmail and 
grooming…Intelligence from the NCA and police forces shows that that dangerous 
offenders are capitalising on the immediacy of contact that live streaming offers” 
(National Crime Agency, 2017a).  
Online video streaming platforms now provide users with an opportunity to share content and 
to observe (via streaming) video material posted by others, without exhibiting ownership of it 
in terms of intentionally downloading and storing video content. A significant proportion of 
Internet users now watch video content online (Statista, 2018b) where ‘as of 2017, 81.2% of 
online users in the U.S. alone (over 200 million) accessed digital video content’ (Statista, 
2018c; 2018d), a figure which is predicted to rise. With such volumes of traffic come regulatory 
problems linked to both the uploading and distribution of video content in breach of law and 
platform policies, and, the subsequent viewing and engagement with such material. Whilst 
mainstream vendors may have the resources to tackle such issues, smaller services may not, 
creating a challenge for law enforcement when attempting to effectively respond to an incident 
of this type. Whilst the discovery of an illegal/policy breaching video online may lead to 
consequences for the video ‘owner’ or a hosting/streaming service provider, identifying who 
has viewed and interacted with the video may lead to further liability for such individuals. This 
is apparent in cases of streamed indecent content where the National Crime Agency (2017b; 
2017c; 2017d) in 2017 have noted numerous instances of users prosecuted for indecent 
imagery offences under English law after interacting with online indecent video material. 
Extremist video content has also attracted regulatory interest and response, with the United 
Kingdom Home Secretary Amber Rudd seeking to impose stronger penalties on those who 
repeatedly view terrorist material online in an attempt to strengthen existing regulation under 
areas such as section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (Travis, 2017). 
Acts of video streaming (whether live or the replay of pre-recorded hosted content) can be 
associated with a number of potential offences and where a suspect’s device has been seized, 
forensic analysis may be required to identify any potential streamed content. Whilst Internet 
history records may in some instances provide a pointer to a hosted video that has been 
accessed, this may not always be an effective at identifying any streamed content. Where a 
video has since been removed by a provider (no longer accessible online by a practitioner for 
verification of content), locally cached stream data (providing it can be interpreted) may be the 
only source of information remaining to identify a streams content and context. Further in 
offences involving indecent imagery, the identification and recovery of imagery left behind by 
a stream on a local device may facilitate a charge of possession or making indecent imagery 
under English law (see Protection of Children Act 1978 and Criminal Justice Act 1988).  
With regards a forensic examination of the impact and recovery of streamed video on a local 
device, limited information exists. This article provides one of the first commentaries in this 
area, and aims to support those carrying out investigations of this type to ensure effective 
evidence recovery and interpretation. In doing so, this work addresses the following questions. 
1. Is streamed video content stored on a local device when viewed? And if so; 
a) Can streamed video content be recovered and viewed? 
b) Is it possible to determine how much of a video has been viewed? 
Within the confines of this article two case studies are presented, an examination of YouTube 
and Facebook Live video streams. Due to limitations with article size, only the Chrome Internet 
browser has been examined as a platform for accessing and streaming video content. Both 
testing methodologies and results are offered.  
2 YouTube 
YouTube (www.youtube.com) is a video sharing and streaming service owned by Google 
and maintains significant popularity with a reported estimate of 184 million users in the U.S. 
alone (Statista, 2018), with a reported 400 hours of video uploaded every minute (Schindler, 
2017). Whilst the platform offers a popular source of material across a number of topic areas, 
it has also attracted criticism, particularly focused at its regulation of resident content. 
Mechanisms for child protection and their apparent failures have been highlighted (BBC News, 
2017b) with reports of up to 100,000 predatory accounts leaving indecent comments on video 
material (BBC News, 2017c). Further, reports of indecent content and videos depicting child 
characters in inappropriate situations (designed to trick child viewers into watching) have been 
noted (BBC News, 2017d; 2018b). In November 2017, YouTube were reported to have 
removed almost 50,000 videos documenting extremist content, however, were criticised for 
an apparent slowness to act (BBC News, 2017a). In addition, concerns have also been raised 
due to the hosting of videos depicting anti-Semitic and gang culture (BBC News, 2017f; 
2018a). 
Where the investigation of a suspect leads to the analysis of their YouTube viewing habits, 
resident Internet history may provide some support. A standard YouTube URL is structured 
as follows: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mXFjwihUO00 where there URL itself 
is prefixed with a unique identifier (bolded above) for the YouTube video itself. In some cases, 
a practitioner can search for the video using this identifier and verify its content. However, this 
process alone may not address the following two points of concern. 
1. Video removal: A user may view a video that has since been removed before a 
practitioner inspection can take place. In this case, a practitioner may identify a 
suspected URL, but be unable to locate the video on the YouTube site. Whilst it may 
be possible to request an account disclosure from YouTube, a record of such 
information may no longer exist, or limited organizational resources may deem 
disclosure routes impractical. 
2. Behavior: Where a video is of large length, determining how much of a video a user 
has watched and what particular content may be of evidential value and could provide. 
In the cases noted above, resident cached video data may provide the only source of 
determining the context of a streamed video. As a result, the remainder of Section 2 offers an 
examination of the impact of YouTube streams in the Chrome web browser cache. 
2.1 Preliminary Approach 
To provide an initial insight into the challenges of investigating stream caching, an initial test 
designed to explore the use of file identification, parsing and recovery processes to examine 
the browser cache following the viewing of a test stream was ran. This was intended to 
simulate traditional analysis approaches, which involve large-scale file recovery and viewing 
processes typically undertaken through the running of automated procedural scripts. The 
following methodology has been implemented.   
Preparation: To start, a standard clean install of the Windows 10 operating system was 
implemented and the Chrome (version 63.0.3239.132 (latest at time of testing)) browser was 
installed (and unused). 
Test data: A uniquely identifiable YouTube video was chosen as suitable test data and its 
content recorded. This would allow for a visual identification and verification of any 
subsequently recovered streamed content (following the analysis stage) on the local machine 
resulting from the test stream. The chrome cache folders 
(C:\Users\Staff\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cache) 
were verified as empty to prevent contamination by any existing data. 
Viewing the stream: The test YouTube video’s URL was entered into the Chrome browser 
window and the video was played in full. The browser was then closed and the machine was 
shut down and imaged. 
Analysis: X-Ways forensics version 19.3’s comprehensive search options were utilized to 
recover (identify or carve, and reconstruct) all potential image, video and internet related data. 
Reliance was placed on automated media gathering processes to simulate traditional case 
procedures that are often used in forensic investigations to pre-process any existing media 
files en-masse for later review. On completion, four still thumbnail-sized cached images 
(.jpg) denoting content (video frames) contained within the stream were recovered by both 
tools (located at C:\Users\Staff\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User 
Data\Default\Cache). 41 .webm (a compressed video stream format (FileInfo, n.d.)) files 
were also located following the parsing of the Chrome cache metadata and cache data files. 
All .webm were exported given they are reported to be video stream files and opened using 
VLC media player version 2.2.6 where only one file was playable, containing content from the 
first three seconds of the test video stream. All other .webm files returned errors upon 
attempting to play. 
2.2 Does this mean the video content is not there? 
To provide an initial indicator of the presence of content being cached locally, when a YouTube 
video is loaded, buffering takes place (the download and storage of a portion of video data, 
ready for playing), indicated by the grey video bar (see Figure 1). To test for the presence of 
local data, once a portion of the stream has been buffered, the removal of an Internet 
connection allows some of the buffered portion of the stream to be replayed. Without the ability 
to access data on the YouTube server, it would appear that this information is being replayed 
from locally resident content. 
 
 
Figure 1: An example of a buffered YouTube stream. 
 
Google Chrome’s developer mode (accessed by Ctrl+Shift+i) allows users to monitor 
network activity generated by a web page within a browser window. Figure 2 provides an 
example of the network activity generated live during an active YouTube stream. Of notable 
interest are the videoplayback?lmt= entries which coincide with the addition of a new 
buffered partition of the stream. For example, every time that the YouTube stream video bar 
adds an additional buffered portion of the stream, directly preceding this event is a 
videoplayback?lmt= request entry. Each entry of this type maintains a MIME type of 
video/webm. Further, each request results in the downloading and local storage of chunks 
of data, in some cases being almost 2MB in size. 
 Figure 2: Google’s developer mode during a YouTube video stream. 
Google’s developer mode suggests that caching is actually taking place on the local disk in 
relation to stream content. Using ChromeCacheView v1.76 (available 
http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/chrome_cache_view.htm) Chrome’s cache folders 
can be parsed and monitored in real time during test conditions to assess the incremental 
impact of web browsing actions on locally stored content. Figure 3 provides an example of the 
cached video files (video file filter applied) following a test stream view. Test results indicate 
that when a YouTube stream is accessed, the process of buffering does result in data being 
incrementally stored on the local device.  
At this point it is also necessary to draw reference back to the preliminary testing carried out 
in section 2.1. Such work was designed to resemble typical ‘en-masse’ automated media 
recovery processes followed by a single file review (placed in an appropriate media player). 
The problem with such processes in relation to analyzing cached streams lies with media files 
being reviewed as single entities (complete videos in their own right). This consensus sits in 
conflict with the process of streaming, where a video is broken down and transferred via 
smaller data packages. Whilst when examined as single files, only the start of a stream can 
be reviewed, the remaining stream content can be viewed, but only following an effective 
reassembly of the buffered stream fragments (see Section 2.3). 
2.3 Video reconstruction  
To reconstruct the YouTube stream, all .webm entries must first be collected. Whereas 
preliminary testing indicated that 1 of the 41 .webm files is playable, all files collectively form 
1 complete stream, but to view this content they must be processed correctly in the following 
way. 
 
Figure 3: ChromeCacheView displaying Chrome’s cache containing video content. 
Each .webm entry maintains a portion of a stream and reassembly must take place in order to 
create a viewable video. Where a YouTube video has been cached, using 
ChromeCacheView to order cache entries by their last accessed date and time provides the 
order in which artefacts are cached in Chrome on the local disk (as shown in Figure 3).  Each 
.webm cache entry must have its associated URL (see Magnet Forensics (2017) for an 
overview of the Chrome cache functionality) examined in order to identify its ‘fragment order’ 
(an attribute coined in this article). A typical .webm cached artefact URL is structured as 
follows: 
https://r2---sn-
aigl6ned.googlevideo.com/videoplayback?itag=244&keepalive=yes&lmt=15
15578817467917&key=yt6&signature=76C58D7F78D783433894A5035F5782BC42B
24479.1267C0A3034DC4EBDA3C7968798118B3810E0BE3&ms=au&mv=m&mt=1516012
566&requiressl=yes&ip=152.105.118.127&ipbits=0&gcr=gb&pl=16&id=o-
AE1mirNM9fvhqmgotXSh29VDXx1bmxZr2dzVu_HMWonX&mime=video%2Fwebm&mn=sn
-aigl6ned&mm=31&expire=1516034260&ei=dIRcWoSZI4LgV-
T7ucAH&initcwndbps=1595000&gir=yes&dur=272.440&source=youtube&clen=2
1255658&sparams=aitags%2Cclen%2Cdur%2Cei%2Cgcr%2Cgir%2Cid%2Cinitcwnd
bps%2Cip%2Cipbits%2Citag%2Ckeepalive%2Clmt%2Cmime%2Cmm%2Cmn%2Cms%2Cm
v%2Cpl%2Crequiressl%2Csource%2Cexpire&aitags=133%2C134%2C135%2C136%2
C137%2C160%2C242%2C243%2C244%2C247%2C248%2C278&ratebypass=yes&alr=ye
s&cpn=QhnO2WvdKbz3nFlQ&c=WEB&cver=2.20180111&range=0-
188013&rn=0&rbuf=0 
 
Of particular interest is the range= value (noted in bold), which can be used to determine the 
order of frames within the cached video stream. Typical YouTube streams which are .webm 
maintain a header frame which identifies the start of the video. This is identifiable via its .webm 
signature (shown in Table 1) and will have a range= value of 0-<number>. During testing, 
this was found to be the only .webm file which was playable when accessed individually. The 
dur= attribute notes the entire length of the video, not the amount of video which has been 
cached to the local disk. 
Using the header file as a starting position, additional .webm files must be concatenated (a 
binary file concatenation, joining for example the header fragment to a second fragment in 
sequence order to create a separate combined file) to it in order to recreate the video (see 
Figure 4). This must be done in frame order using the values stored in the range= attribute. 
Whilst the header file maintains an identifiable .webm signature, testing indicates that the 
following stream chunks do not maintain a consistent header structures. Therefore, to identify 
the order of all stream fragments, this must be done using the range= ordering variable and 
via the parsing of Chrome cache artefacts and their associated metadata to identify their MIME 
types and associated URL containing the range= attribute (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: A breakdown of a hypothetical reconstruction of a YouTube stream 
File Order File Order Range (example values) File Signature 
Header  1 0-188013 0x1A 0x45 0xDF 0xA3 0x9F 
0x42 0x86 0x81 0x01 0x42 
0xF7 0x81 0x01 0x42 0xF2 
0x81 0x04 0x42 0xF3 0x81 
0x08 0x42 0x82 0x84 0x77 
0x65 0x62 0x6D 0x42 
 
Data Fragment  2 188014-35644 N/A 
Data Fragment  3 35645-611485 N/A 
Data Fragment  4 611486-983432 N/A 
 
 
Figure 4. A hypothetical structure of the reassembled (concatenated) stream file. 
 2.4 Points to note 
First, only the buffered part of a stream can be reconstructed and it was not possible to identify 
which sub-portion of the buffered content a user had viewed on screen. Therefore, where a 
user buffers 40 seconds of a 50 second video, the final 10 seconds cannot be reconstructed 
as the buffered content is not local (see Figure 4). Reconstruction is not effected by a user 
watching the video, therefore where a user loads a video but immediately pauses it, buffered 
but ‘non-watched’ content is still stored and can be reconstructed. However, buffered content 
is not evidence of ‘viewed’ content despite YouTube’s buffering being dynamic where unless 
the user plays the stream, a complete buffering of the video does not occur. Typically, testing 
indicated that when a YouTube video is loaded but immediately paused, around 30 seconds 
of stream content is buffered locally and can be reconstructed.  
Second, stream reconstruction requires a full cache investigation in order to parse cached 
content and the associated metadata belonging to any cached artefacts. Without the range= 
value, reassembly is unlikely to be successful and likely be based on guessing the relevant 
order of files. This issue also means that there is a potentially low success rate of recovering 
and rebuilding fragmented streams where content is no longer in the cache (for example an 
unallocated cluster recovery) as relevant stream metadata needed for rebuilding may be 
missing.  
Third, attempts to rebuild streams with an incomplete set of stream fragments or in the wrong 
order typically results in a non-viewable rebuilt stream. This is even the case where one 
fragment appears out of order. 
Fourth, during testing a small number of .mp4 formatted YouTube streams were also 
encountered. Their behavior in the cache is comparable to .webm streams, where a rebuild 
can be obtained via ordering of the range= URL attribute (see also discussions in section 3 
for signature information for .mp4 formatted streams).   
3 Facebook Live 
Facebook Live is an additional feature of the Facebook platform giving users the ability to live 
stream video content. Streamed content becomes available as part of the Facebook profile 
where existing privacy and permission settings regarding the availability of the video apply. 
Public broadcasts can be viewed by those who passively access the account, whereas private 
broadcasts can be limited to those who are ‘friends’ of the account holder. Once a live 
broadcast has finished, the video will remain available (subsequent to the author deleting or 
adjusting viewing settings) and can be viewed later (taking the form of a recorded stream). As 
with many video platforms, large amounts of traffic is harmless, yet instances of the Facebook 
Live service abuse have been noted. These include reports of live broadcasts depicting sexual 
assaults (BBC News, 2017g), threatening behaviors (BBC News, 2017h), potential copyright 
infringement (BBC News, 2017i) and broadcasted murder (BBC News, 2017j). 
3.1 Initial Testing 
It is first key to note what is and what is not cached when interacting with Facebook Live. 
When a user ‘live broadcasts’ and a suspect account watches the broadcast live, testing 
indicated that no caching occurs in the suspect’s Chrome browser cache. To test this, following 
the same procedural steps to create a clean test environment as noted in Section 2.1, a 
separate lab machine was used to initialize a test Facebook Live broadcast. On the test 
machine, the URL of the live broadcast was entered into the Chrome browser in order to take 
the user directly to this live broad cast. For the duration of the 1-minute-long broadcast, the 
suspect Chrome cache was reviewed live using ChromeCacheView (refreshing the application 
every 2 seconds). On completion of the broadcast, the suspect’s browser was closed and the 
cache was finally examined with no video caching activity apparent (in comparison to the 
impact of a replayed stream discussed in Section 3.2). Therefore, testing indicates that those 
who only view live broadcasts do not have stream content cached in their Chrome browser 
cache.   
3.2. Stream Replays  
In contrast to watching live broadcasts, when a user replays a hosted Facebook Live 
broadcast (i.e. a suspect watches a video which a user has left hosted after a live broadcast 
– essentially replaying the content), browser caching does take place. Following the replay of 
a Facebook Live hosted video, Figure 5 demonstrates the typical impact of this process on 
the Chrome browser cache. Stream fragments are noted to be in .mp4 format, yet none are 
playable as individual files (tested using VLC media player version 2.2.6). 
 
Figure 5: Replay of a Facebook Live video displayed in ChromeCacheView. 
As with YouTube streams, these fragments can be reassembled (binary concatenated as with 
YouTube stream fragments) to reconstruct stream content, but only through an analysis of the 
URL of the cached artefact. A typical Facebook Live video cached artefact URL is structured 
as follows when analyzed using ChromeCacheView. 
https://scontent-lhr3-1.xx.fbcdn.net/v/t42.1790-
29/26947798_1548879368500753_3538282435986849792_n.mp4?efg=eyJ2ZW5jb
2RlX3RhZyI6ImRhc2hfbGl2ZV9tZF9mcmFnXzJfYXVkaW8ifQ%3D%3D&oh=a5c44f017
2736933195c1eaf2e35bb9d&oe=5A5E4AFF&bytestart=52910&byteend=69481 
To rebuild the stream, the oe=, bytestart= and byteend= attributes are important. Testing 
indicates that the oe= attribute acts as a stream identifier. Figure 6 provides an example where 
despite only one stream being viewed, cached stream fragments are sorted by their oe= 
attribute, where only matching oe= values form part of the same stream rebuild. The 
bytestart= and byteend= attributes denote the order of concatenation. 
 Figure 6: An example of oe= attribute values in the cache. 
Rebuilding the stream is a similar process to that of YouTube where a binary concatenation 
of files will potentially create a viewable stream. 
Typically, stream rebuild fragments will appear as noted in Figure 7, with a typical .mp4 
structured header (ftyoiso identifier), followed by a sidx identifier fragment and finally a 
series of moof identifier fragments. Only buffered content of a Facebook Live replayed video 
can be recovered. 
 
 Figure 7: A hypothetical structure of the Facebook Live stream rebuild. 
 
**Points to note: Whilst the example in Figure 6 shows three potential oe= attribute streams, 
only one contains the actual video stream itself when rebuilt in the correct order. Testing was 
unable to determine which oe= attribute contains the stream before rebuilding; therefore all 
must be built in order to create a viewable stream. In addition, whilst the bytestart= and 
byteend= attributes must be used in incremental order to determine the order of 
concatenation, they are not always perfectly numerically aligned (for example, not always 1, 
2, 3, 4 – sometimes 1, 3, 4, 6). Providing they were in incremental numerical value order, 
testing indicated that a stream rebuild could still be achieved. 
4 Concluding Points 
Streaming platforms are likely to continue to pose regulatory issues with future incidents of 
abuse almost certain to be reported. In response to such incidents, digital forensics 
practitioners will likely be tasked with effectively reconstructing streamed data to establish the 
presence of policy/law breaching material. This article has offered an introductory case study 
on the forensic processing of cached video stream data in the Chrome web browser to support 
forensic practitioners. The rebuilding of video stream fragments has been demonstrated in 
order to produce a viewable video clip of locally buffered data.   
In both cases, traditional ‘single file’ media analysis strategies for identifying and examining 
media content as single entities are ineffective. Stream fragments must be identified from 
within the cache where an analysis of both the cached artefact and their associated metadata 
contained within the cache files is required. The ChromeCacheView application facilitates a 
parsing of the Chrome cache folders and this process is needed in order to carry out an 
effective stream rebuild, where a suspect’s cache folders can be exported from a case and 
examined separately using this tool. Cached metadata surrounding each artefact is needed to 
allow stream fragments to be correctly ordered during a stream rebuild. An absence of this 
data would result in a practitioner having to guess the order of the fragments, which is arguably 
not feasible, particularly where a stream is of large length and a number of fragments have 
been cached.   
Whilst only two streaming services have been analyzed, it is hoped that the examination 
methodologies and considerations presented are applicable to a forensic analysis of other 
streaming services and web browser caches, which requires future analysis to determine. 
However, this work provides an indication of the need to consider the possibly of analyzing 
video media files as a collective rather than relying on ‘single file viewing’ as a means of 
identify and validating video content.   
4.1 Future work  
This work has offered a starting point for local video stream analysis whilst highlighting 
investigatory approaches. Future work involves the expansion of analysis in three possible 
directions. First, Chrome as a platform to access the stream has been utilized and work must 
expand analysis into both additional browser types and caching via mobile applications 
(mobile application browsers and direct applications such as the YouTube app). Second, there 
are multiple streaming platforms, which are in need of further testing and analysis with 
examples including ‘Twitch’.  Finally, characteristics of cached streams should be further 
examined. This includes an analysis of the persistence of cached stream data in the browser 
cache and the potential for recoverability following a ‘cache clear’ should be tested. In addition, 
the identification and recoverability of stream content from caches that have be subject to 
heavy use requires further investigation.    
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